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Why the Outlaw Won the War:
How Civil War Foreign Diplomacy Pivoted Around an Illegal Blockade
Three's Company, Too
Although most people only remember two, there were three main players in the
American Civil War: the North, the South, and the specter of Great Britain. For the
duration of the war, Great Britain, the world's strongest naval power, was officially
neutral, but everyone at that time knew that, had she chosen to enter the fray, she (and the
intimidating European alliance that would have followed in her wake) would have held
keys to victory. 1
As a result, both the Union's and the Confederacy's war strategies pivoted around
obtaining Britain's diplomatic favor. Although many factors affected Britain's
willingness to intervene and the Northern ability to win, this paper will focus on the
effects of the Northern blockade. The Union had constructed a rickety blockade that she
hoped to keep intact. Ineffective though it was, the Confederacy longed for its demise. As
a result, both powers petitioned the British. The South pled for two tightly interwoven
demands: diplomatic recognition and a blockade broken by British forces. The Union had
a simpler but more rigorous request: that the British keep out of the conflict altogether.
After all, the Union leaders clearly understood that any outside intervention could signal
their doom.

2

Great Britain understood that as well. They realized that lending the Confederacy
even limited aid could tip the balance in Southern favor, splitting the Union in two. Many
1

Norman A. Graebner, "Northern Diplomacy and European Neutrality," Why the North Won the
Civil War, edited by David Donald (Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 49.
2
Brian Jenkins. Britain and the War for the Union (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press,
1974), 1:39.
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Britons longed to watch the great democratic experiment bite the dust. 3 In addition to
demonstrating the supremacy of the system of constitutional monarchy and vindicating
the British defeat in the Revolutionary War, such a collapse would free up the remainder
of the North American continent to be claimed by European (preferably British) powers.
At the same time, however, the British realized that remaining unentangled in the
conflict could also bear fruit. Having just extracted themselves from the Crimean War,
they were not eager to squander their thriving economy and vast resources on another
conflict, however small it might be. They realized that there were plenty of economic
advantages available to them as neutrals. 4 Besides, although the British needed Southern
cotton to meet their manufacturing needs, they realized that the North could offer them
something that would be equally valuable in the long run: a new naval precedent. 5
When the Crimean War of the 1850s had concluded, the British had lost more
than their will to fight; they had also lost their naval edge. The Declaration of Paris,
which had officially closed the conflict, had also pick-pocketed Great Britain's greatest
naval asset: the blockade. Although the Declaration didn't outlaw blockading altogether,
it made the requirements for a legal blockade so rigorous that it might as well have. 6 This
rancid memory made the British think twice before unraveling the frayed Northern
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blockade. After all, if the inadequate Northern blockade was honored, subsequent British
blockades could escape the Declaration's exacting standards as well. 7
As a result, the British decision of whether or not to intervene during the Civil
War's first two years hinged not on the battlefield but on the seas. The South spent those
years trying to convince Britain that the Northern blockade was illegal. The North spent
them trying to make her blockade legal by shoring it up. In the meantime, the North made
plain her opinion that the acts of breaking the blockade and recognizing the Confederacy
were inextricably intertwined and that either one would be interpreted as a tacit
declaration of war. 8
Most countries that gain advantages in wars achieve them through military and
naval prowess; the Union, by contrast, gained hers through her shortcomings. Although
elementary school textbooks might paint the Union victorious after the surrender at
Appotomax, the North scored an ironic and equally important victory when her good-fornothing 1861 to 1862 blockade played a large part in convincing the British to do what
Northerners wanted them to do the most: to keep out.

How Others Have Seen This Same Blockade
I am not the first author to chronicle the impact of the North's blockade during the
Civil War. In reading the short historiographical section of the multi-authored work, Why

the South Lost the War, one is almost overawed by the abundance of historians who have
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focused on the blockade. 9 That book's authors depict blockade historiography as having
come in three phases.
The first wave of blockade historians, which included Merton Coulter, Bern
Anderson, Charles P. Roland, and James R. Soley, traced the blockade's evolution from
inadequate to airtight, arguing that the blockade's efficacy was a major factor in the
South's defeat. The second wave of historians, which included FrankL. Owsley, Marcus
W. Price, and Richard E. Wood, balked at their predecessors' interpretations, insisting
that the blockade was never effective and was ultimately a failure. After them, a third
wave followed with a different focus: the Confederacy's response to the blockade. These
historians, which included Richard Lester and Richard Goff, claimed that the
Confederacy did not make responding to the blockade a top priority and implied that, if
she had, she could have won the war.
For my studies, I decided to zero in on a cross-section of these three approaches,
focusing on the notably inefficient first two years of the blockade. In addition, I decided
to investigate how the blockade's incompetence shaped Northern and Southern
interactions with Great Britain. I found many helpful interpretations of this situation
tucked away in chapters devoted to the blockade in comprehensive Civil War histories.
Especially helpful were James McPherson's Battle Cry ofFreedom, editor David
McDonald's Why the North Won the War, Peter J. Parish's The American Civil War, and
the multi-authored work, Why the South Lost the War. Volumes of this sort interpreted
the blockade (once it became effective) as one of many factors contributing to the
Northern victory.

Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr, Why the South
Lost the Civil War, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1986).
9
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When I needed more detail on interactions with the British, I turned to classics
such as Brian Jenkins's Britain and the War for the Union, Ephraim Adams's Great

Britain and the American Civil War, Howard Jones's The Union, the Confederacy, and
the Atlantic Rim, James Callahan's Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, and
D.P. Crook's The North, the South, and the Powers. These histories provided blow-byblow accounts of international diplomacy from which I was able to glean a more
complete understanding of gradual trends.
In the end, I stirred together conclusions from all of these sources to enhance my

understanding of a topic of which I had seen nothing in print: how the sheer inefficacy of
the Northern blockade from 1861 to 1862 played a large role in keeping the British from
intervening on the Confederacy's behalf. This happenstance was incredibly ironic
because, had the early Northern efforts created a blockade effective enough to meet the
standards of the Declaration of Paris, the blockade probably couldn't have achieved the
comparable diplomatic results.

Blockade My Foot
One would expect that a blockade worthy of receiving so much diplomatic
attention must have been absolutely crippling to the British economy; ironically, its real
state couldn't have been farther from the truth. On average during the war, five out of six
vessels that attempted to run the blockade made it through (in 1861, nine out of ten made
it out with no problem). These blockade runners made sure that Southern ports stayed
busy, hauling out half a million bales of cotton in exchange for two million shoes, half a
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million rifles, a thousand tons of gunpowder, and a mind-boggling amount of other war
supplies. 10
Although some enthusiasts like Commander S.F. Dupont thrilled at the thought of
the blockade's establishment, hoping it would "squeeze the South more than anything,"
few were surprised by the blockade's inefficacy. 11 From the moment Lincoln announced
the blockade, the British raised their eyebrows, doubtful that blockading such an
enormous area was truly practical for the Union navy. 12 Since the British had blockaded
the Eastern coast during the American Revolution, they knew exactly how challenging
such a chore could be. The area to be enclosed was enormous: 35,549 miles of coastline
laced with numerous tiny inlets and parallel streams. The British had been unable to
effectively accomplish the feat with their 800 vessels; it was no wonder they laughed
when the North approached the chore with only forty. 13 Jefferson Davis heckled the
scanty Union effort, remarking that the Union's navy was "insufficient to blockade
effectively the coast of a single State," much less the entire southern shore. 14
Launching a weak blockade that then was gradually fortified was not unheard of;
in fact, that was the strategy employed traditionally by the British, one that had brought
them great success and created great resentment in those whom it victimized. After the
British blockade of the Crimean War, Britain's enemies agitated strongly for a treaty that
would prohibit such "paper blockades." 'They defined a paper blockade as an instance in
McPherson, 388.
S.F. Dupont, Civil War Letters: Volume 1: The Mission, edited by John Hayes
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 67, 76. Although there is some dispute about a blockade ofthe
entire coastline or only several ports of entry was essential to obtain the blockaders' objectives, there is
little disagreement over the fact that the Northern blockade was very weak during the war's first two years.
12
Adams, 246.
13
"The Departments: The Report of the Secretary of the Navy," The New York Times 8 Dec 1864,
Proquest, via McKee Library, http://library.southern.edu (accessed September 28, 2006).
14
Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government (New York: Sagamore Press,
1958), 2:373.
10
11
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which a country claimed that its ships formed an impermeable barrier that halted all
international commerce but in actuality accomplished little, allowing foreign ships to slip
through freely and continue trade. In 1856, the British had reluctantly accepted the new
stipulations for an effective blockade when they signed the Declaration of Paris along
with every other "civilized nation" except for the United States. 15 In the Declaration, the
British agreed that from there on out, "blockades, in order to be binding, must be
effective ... maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the
enemy." 16
Some sections of the Declaration were feared by Southerners who worried that
they might damage Confederate commerce. 17 The portion about paper blockades,
however, they embraced entirely, making it the fulcrum of their foreign policy. They
were thrilled because that proclamation, originally intended by the European nations to
be wielded against Britain, could now be used against the North. Although Lincoln had
vowed that a "competent force [would] be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of

15

The United States was engaged in the Declaration's negotiations and in fact proposed her own
amendment, but when it took too long for her amendment to be tacked on, she lost interest in the document.
16
Adams, 1: 140.
17
Jenkins, 41-42. Adams, 150, 201. One of the reasons that the United States had refused to sign
the Declaration of Paris was because they clung to their right as a neutral to engage in privateering, i.e.
armed robbery of belligerent ships. In prior conflicts, this privilege had been invaluable since the United
States had been the weaker naval power. Privateering was one of the only ways that underdogs could gain
an advantage.
When the Civil War began, however, the tables turned. Suddenly the South was the weaker power
and the one using privateering as a form of exploitation. As a result, the Union was filled with remorse for
not having signed the Declaration of Paris. They hoped that if they signed the document to abolish
privateering, it would cause the other European powers to look down on the Confederacy as more primitive
because she still privateered. The Union hoped that the European powers would not bestow recognition on
a primitive country.
More than that, the North hoped that, after the Union signed the Declaration, the European nations
would intervene with their navies to prevent the South from privateering and defying the Declaration. This
Union wish, however, never came true. The foreign powers saw through her scheme, and she was never
permitted to sign the Declaration.
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vessels from the ports," it was common knowledge during the first two years of the war
that the rickety blockade was not in full working order. 18
In fact, according to Jefferson Davis (and numerous other irate Southerners), the
Union's "announcement of a mere paper blockade" suspiciously resembled the
inadequate British blockades of old.

19

The Confederate states were certain that they were

not the only ones who saw the parallel, and they very verbally cherished the hope that
Britain, dead-set on enforcing the Declaration, would declare the Northern blockade
illegal, puncture it with their ships, and send it to the bottom of the sea. 20
Plus, the South found another source of hope in the doubletalk used by the North.
The North claimed that it could declare the Confederacy a rebellion while blockading her
coast at the same time. This assertion, however, was a diplomatic paradox After all,
international law declared that nations never blockaded their own territory, only that of an
independent foe. Claiming to blockade the Confederacy was as good as declaring her
independent. If the Confederacy was only rebelling, then the North should have instead
declared Southern ports closed.
William Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of War, was painfully aware ofthis
contradiction, but he was even more aware that Great Britain would disregard a simple
declaration that the Southern ports were closed, especially if the Southern states were

18

Abraham Lincoln, "Proclamation Declaring a Blockade of the South's Ports," Essential
Documents in American History: 1492-present, Academic Search Premier, via McKee Library
http://library.southem.edu (accessed August 31, 2006).
19
Davis, Jefferson, "War Message," The Annals ofAmerica: 1858-1865, The Crisis of the Union
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 1968), 9: 268.
_ _ ,The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, 2: 373-374.
20
Mary Boykin Chesnut, A Diary From Dixie, edited by Ben Ames Williams, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1949), 92. McPherson, 383. Ironically, both the North and the South cherished hopes of
foreign intervention on behalf of preserving the honor of different aspects of the Declaration. No such
interference, however, ever came through.
21
Ibid, 388.
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able to keep on trading as if nothing was wrong. In Seward's eyes, using inconsistent
terminology that was controversial was a wiser move than being technically correct and
completely ignored. 22 Seward's verbal paradox irked the Confederate leaders, but there
wasn't much they could do about it beyond crossing their fingers that such diplomatic
impertinence would trigger European intervention. All of this drama snowballed around
an obsession with the fact that the Union blockade was fundamentally ineffective.

Belliger-whats?
The British leaders were not pleased with the situation into which they had been
thrust. From the beginning, a blockade had been their worst nightmare. "Above all things,
endeavor to prevent a blockade of the Southern coast," Lord John Russell, the British
Foreign Secretary, had implored the prime minister in February of 1861. "It would
produce misery, discord and enmity incalculable."23 Beyond that, the issue was a hassle
because it forced Great Britain to take sides. If she declared that the South was in
rebellion, then she was giving her blessing to the Northern effort. If she declared the
Northern blockade illegitimate, then she was bestowing her favor upon the South. Great
Britain understood that, if she explicitly endorsed any aspect of either side's agenda,
neutrality would become nearly impossible Although at other points in history she
might have welcomed such an opportunity, at this moment that prospect was particularly
displeasing. Because Great Britain had just wrapped up one nasty conflict, the Crimean
War, she was not chomping at the bit to entering another.
22

Parish, 407. Merli, 40. Later Seward discovered that his instinctual belief that the British would
refuse to honor such a declaration had been on target. When Seward mentioned in passing to Lord Lyons,
the British Ambassador to Washington, that the North was pondering declaring Southern ports closed,
Lyons responded immediately that England would consider such a declaration "null and void."
23
Europe Looks at the Civil War, edited by Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (New
York: The Orion Press, 1960), 19.
24
"Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams," 1.
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Even so, Great Britain had to come to terms with the Northern blockade
somehow. For the British, common sense insisted that the Confederate upheaval, with its
population approaching nine million, its 750,000 miles of terrain, its well-orchestrated
army, and its coherent constitution was far too advanced to be considered a rebellion
As Lord Russell pointed out, one doesn't recruit 400,000 soldiers and cough up
$400,000,000 to extinguish a riot. 26
A desire to safeguarde Great Britain's honor also played a part. As the war rolled
on, numerous Confederate complaints regarding Northern conduct on the seas insisted
that through innumerable violations of the Declaration of Paris, the Union was
"claim[ing] a general jurisdiction over the high seas" that truly belonged to England. 27
Whether or not the North was really making this claim, such Southern accusations ruffled
many a British feather. More importantly, the British understood that eventually they
would have to obtain more Southern cotton for their manufacturing sector, and they knew
that cotton could only be obtained by going through the blockade
To deal with these issues, Southern diplomat William Yancey set sail for England.
Although his pro-slavery and slave trade tendencies handicapped his diplomatic influence
in anti-slavery Britain, he had one strong advantage over the Union representative:
Yancey arrived first. And he took advantage of his early arrival to press for diplomatic
recognition and to protest fervently the blockade's illegitimacy. Whether it was because
of Yancey's eloquence, because of deep-seated British convictions, or because of a non25

McPherson, 388.
John Evans, Atlantic Impact (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1952), 138.
27
"The Civil War in America," Illustrated London News 39, no 1121 (14 Dec. 1861): 593,
http://beck.library.emory.edu (accessed October 27, 2006).
Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959),
221-2.
28
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confrontational desire to come to some conclusion without having to engage in Northern
negotiations, the British hastily announced their position on the day before the Northern
diplomat arrived Their two-step verdict of neutrality partially pleased and partially
peeved both sides.
First of all, although the British did not fully recognize the Confederacy or offer
her aid, England did award the South makeshift belligerent status, which everyone
assumed was an indisputable segway to formal diplomatic recognition. 30 After all,
"intercourse of any kind with the so-called Commissioners [would be] liable to be
construed as a recognition ofthe authority which appointed them." 31 Although the Union
found this belligerent recognition annoying, it did not come as a huge surprise because
British and Confederate cotton interests were so closely intertwined. 32
Instead, it was the second part of the British declaration that astonished both the
North and the South, when in spite of Yancey's insistence that the blockade was
practically invisible, the British declared it fully legal instead. 33 The North hailed the
news with exultation, the South with outrage and alarm. 34 From that moment on,
protestations of the blockade's obvious illegality would become the number one
complaint that tattletaling Southern diplomats carried to Great Britain, a matter which
was to the Confederacy comparable in importance only to securing diplomatic
recognition. As a result, Confederate-British relations from 1861 to 1862 pivoted
thereafter around a watery hinge: the absurdity of the Northern blockade.
29

McPherson, 387-388.
Graebner, 55. Parish, 497.
31
Abraham Lincoln, "21 May 1861," University of Michigan Digital Library Texts, Collected
Texts ofAbraham Lincoln (accessed November 3, 2006).
32
Merli, 43.
33
Adams, 1: 245-246.
34
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The Forcotton Confederacy Snaps to Inaction

From the first cannon's firing, the Confederacy had built its response to the
Northern blockade around an unspoken asswnption that it would receive British
recognition and aid. 35 One word convinced the South that Southern and British interests
were incalculably intertwined: cotton. 'Throughout the first half ofthe nineteenth century,
cotton had been Britain's most important import and the South's most important export.
The Southern States had provided on average 77.5% of Britain's cotton needs; and in
1860, the last year before the war began, the South had stocked over 80% of Britain's
fluffy arsenal. 36

Wide-spread awareness of these statistics inflated Southern confidence in their
ability to win the war. As a result, Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephans could
not imagine that the blockade would stay around for long. "Our cotton is ... the
tremendous lever by which we can work our destiny," he explained. "In some way or
other [the blockade will] be raised or there will be revolution in Europe." But Stephans,
along with most Southerners, did not plan on being actively engaged in breaking the
blockade; instead, Southerners hoped that English dependence on Southern cotton would
force the British to shatter the blockade while the Confederacy looked on. 37 One
Charleston merchant's comment to the London Times shortly after the war broke out
succinctly swnmed up Southern expectations. "If those miserable Yankees try to

35

Chesnut, 73, 92, 247, 347, 445.
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)

blockade us, and keep you from our cotton, you'll just send them to the bottom and
acknowledge us," he said. "That will be before autumn, I think."38
One result of this overconfident assumption was a scandalous neglect of the
Southern naval program. Because the South expected to elicit British support by
impressing them with Confederate military prowess, the Southern Cabinet funneled most
of its resources into terrestrial army operations instead of funding naval interests. 39 For
most Confederates (at least within the first two years of the war), the blockade was
inefficient, irrelevant, and easy to ignore. 40 Stephen Mallory, the Confederate Secretary
of the Navy, was one of the few who saw it as a latent threat, a cobra slowly but surely
encircling the Confederate regime. Although everyone in the Southern Cabinet believed
that the blockade must be broken in order to win the war, Mallory was the only one who
believed that the South must play an active role in destroying it; the rest longed to leave
the matter in able British hands. 41
Although Mallory did his best to persuade his colleagues to respond to the
blockade by constructing a Confederate navy, the plan seemed too daunting and was not
given top priority. After all, the Confederates had begun the war with no ships, no
seamen, and no suitable naval yards. Although the Confederates had a brief love affair
with British-produced ironclads, this fling was too short-lived to produce long-term
results. 42 As a result, two years into the war, well-known Southern oceanographer
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William Howard Russell, My Diary, North and South (New York: Harper Brothers, 1954), 69.
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Matthew Maury could still observe that it was "evidently no part of the plan of the
[Southern] Administration to have a navy at present or to even encourage one. " 43
Rather than formulating a

ODERULQWHQVLYHnaval

response, the South opted for a

more practical and less taxing option: an embargo. The Confederates believed that the
British suffering that would be inflicted by a cotton embargo would be enough to rouse
the British from their neutral stupor and actuate them to break the blockade. Hoping to
t

secure both revenge and acknowledgement with one stealthy blow, the South decided to
hold back their cotton and let the British enjoy what they insisted existed: an effective
blockade.

44

In order to accomplish this feat, an incredibly ZHOOXQLILHGgrassroots Southern
embargo was launched. Many Congressional endorsements of the embargo were
proposed, but none of them ever passed, leaving the orchestration of the movement
largely in its citizens' capable hands. Local newspapers encouraged their people to "keep
every bale of cotton on the plantation ... [not] send[ing] a thread to New Orleans or
Memphis til England and France have recognized the Confederacy-not one thread. " 45
Patriotic farmers obeyed, taking a fmancial hit in the name of succession. 46
The numbers resulting from the embargo were impressive; during its first (and
only) year, the amount of Southern cotton exported to Europe was 1% of what it had been
before. 47 Unfortunately for its Southern adherents, the embargo's effects on the British
were nowhere near what the South had hoped for. The Confederacy had assumed that the
43

Ibid, 364.
McPherson, 384-385.
45
Ibid, 3 83.
46
Graebner, 59. Those who did not share the enthusiasm were also forced to partake in the
embargo by self-appointed "Committees of Public Safety" who worked to impose a level of vigilante unity.
47
Parish, 398. In late 1862, the embargo gradually lost steam as that strategy was abandoned and a
new one of using cotton to buy war materials was adopted in its stead. Unfortunately, by this time, the
blockade was tightening, and it was becoming increasingly difficult to ship cotton overseas.
44
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British manufacturing industry was one-pronged like the South's own one-crop economy,
which revolved almost entirely around cotton exports. This assumption, however, was
untrue; although cotton manufactures had commandeered the British economy in the past,
for some time now its importance had been receding. 48
The Confederate states' calculations had pictured their embargo's causing
"England [to] topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her, save the
South."49 Instead, the British continued to thrive, and it was the Southern cotton farmers
who found themselves financially floundering. 50 Other unforeseen and unsavory
Confederate quandaries also resulted from the embargo. For example, since the Southern
farmers were riddled with debt, many were not able to supply themselves with war arms.
Worst of all, the Confederacy was robbed of her cotton market as British leaders began to
brainstorm other destinations from which cotton could be imported.
Ironically, what led to the embargo's defeat was what had from the start most
infused Southerners with confidence: their faith in Britain's reliance on Confederate
cotton supplies. Strangely enough, the Southern mistake was not that they had
overestimated their importance to the British manufacturing industry from 1857 to 1860.
48

McPherson, 386. In addition to their belief that the conflict would end soon, the British
understood that the Civil War was continuing to rework the composition of their economy, decreasing
cotton's overall importance and increasing the significance of other industries such as ship-building and
munitions exports. In that way, the cheers in Liverpool, Britain's most prominent ship-building district,
drowned out the moans of Lancashire, a manufacturing district that relied heavily on cotton.
49
McPherson, 383.
so "France and the American Blockade: Attempts to Procure Recognition of the Rebel
Government." The New York Times 26 Oct 1861. Proquest, via McKee Library http://library.southern.edu
(accessed September 28, 2006). Parish, 408. Europe Looks, 211. "Lyons to Russell, Dispatch 585," Oct.
21, 1861, British Eyes, I : 186. Had the British economy been less stable, the Southern embargo might have
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manufacturing districts were "prostrated by the civil war" as a result of the airtight Southern embargo. The
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French were unwilling to intervene alone. Ironically, historians believe that the Confederacy stopped
conducting its embargo right around the time it would have become effective in England.
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On the contrary, the sad reality was that they had done their job too well. They had
overexported, creating a cotton surplus in Britain that would tide the British
manufacturers over until Southern zeal for the embargo was largely extinguished. As a
result, instead of plunging the British cotton-manufacturing industry into a depression,
historians believe that the Southern embargo actually aided the industry, aborting a
recession that would have occurred as a result of the overload. 51
Diplomatically, the embargo also ate away at the likelihood of Southern success.
Even though the Southern government never claimed responsibility for the embargo,
preferring to depict itself to the foreign powers as the hapless victim of a popular
movement, the British understood that the government offered the embargo its tacit
support. As a result, they were disinclined to ally with the South, annoyed that the
Confederacy had tried to coerce them into friendship. "I wonder that the South do not see
that our recognition because they keep cotton from us would be ignominious beyond
measure, & that no English Parlt could do so base a thing," one English leader exclaimed.
The sentiments of thousands of irate British citizens echoed that opinion, and their view
ofthe North's paper blockade was enhanced because of British annoyance with the
Southern embargo. 52

Stacking the Deck:
Why the British Smiled Upon the Northern Blockade
The belief that cotton was king was not confined to the South. William Seward,
whose attitude was characteristic of the average Northerner's, also feared that the British

51
52
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would try to "save cotton at the cost of the Union." 53 His worries were not unfounded;
they were spurred along by many British remarks that seemed to betoken cotton-driven
diplomacy. "We do not like slavery," remarked Prime Minister Henry Palmerston, "but
we want cotton, and we dislike very much your Morrill tariff. " 54
Both the North and the South believed that other factors also presaged British
interference in favor of the Confederacy. For example, although the British had longsince accepted the fact that the United States was no longer a colony, obvious antidemocratic sentiment lingered on.
It is precisely because we do not share the admiration of America for her
own institutions and political tendencies that we do not now see in the
impending change [that is, the collapse of the Union] an event altogether
to be deplored.
wrote Blackwood's magazine in 1861. 55 A crumpled Union offered another enticement, a
promise that the North American continent would once again be fair game, no longer
held captive by the American cult of Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine. 56
And then of course there was the motivation of revenge. In both the Napoleonic
and the Crimean Wars, the Americans had defied ineffective British blockades,
denouncing them as permeable and therefore illegitimate. The opportunity to intervene in
the Civil War now appeared to be the picture-perfect occasion for the British to return the
53
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favor, using the Declaration of Paris's new definition of what constituted a paper
blockade as an excuse to bash the Northern war effort to pieces. 57
But even though all of these factors caused the British to await the Union's
division with "an impatience which it [had] difficulty disguising," two main lines of
reasoning led the British to declare themselves neutral. First of all, they were certain that
the South would triumph by default since the British did not "see how the United States
[could] be cobbled together again by any compromise. " 58 Under the impression that the
war would end quickly with the outcome that they desired, the British did not see any
motivation to enter into an unnecessary and possibly messy intervention. 59 If for some
reason the South was unable to win the war easily, the British did not want to be stuck
with the bloody tab. This aversion forced them to place any thoughts of intervention on
hold until the South demonstrated indisputably that it could attain victory on its own. 60
Secondly, and more importantly, the British thoroughly comprehended the longterm consequences of violating the Northern blockade. Although shutting down Union
pretensions using the Declaration of Paris might be exhilarating for a moment, the British
knew that such a move would be a Pyrrhic victory. "A blockade is by far the most
formidable weapon of offence we possess," noted the London Times. "Surely we ought
not to be over-ready to blunt its edge or injure its temper?" 61
After all, meeting the requirements for a true blockade according to the
Declaration was prohibitively difficult, and the British understood that whatever standard
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they applied to other nations could eventually be retorted against herself." 62 It seemed
absurd that a power that was so self-aware would even consider "tak[ing] a step ... that
may hereafter be quoted against herself, and may make it impossible for her, with honour
or consistency, to avail herself of her superiority at sea." 63
As a result of these considerations, when Lord Russell set to drafting a British
declaration of which characteristics must be in place in order for Britain to regard the
Northern blockade as legitimate, he did so strategically. His definition was nowhere near
the rigorous Declaration of Paris's. Instead, it was lenient, remarking significantly that
the fact that ''various ships may have successfully escaped through [the blockade] ...
[would] not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by international
law." 64 All things considered, the indirect approval of Great Britain gave the rickety
Union blockade the nod.

Building Blockades, Building Relationships
Great Britain's acknowledgement of the blockade, however, would by no means
remain uncontested. From the beginning, the Confederacy was outraged by what they
saw as incomplete neutrality, the policy of a nation that was "clearly [trying] to reopen to
the prejudice of the Confederacy one of the very disputed questions on the law of the
blockade which the Congress of Paris proposed to settle."65 To combat these injustices on
the seas, they decided to send a Southern ambassador to Britain.
The man they selected was William Yancey. Yancey had not sought out his
foreign post; in fact, at first he had declined the offer. But Jefferson Davis insisted,
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demanding that Yancey either take a Cabinet position or become head of the commission
to Europe. After much deliberation and ignored advice, Yancey chose the latter. 66
Although the Confederacy knew what she wanted to accomplish diplomatically,
at first she had no clear conception of how to achieve it. According to the Confederate
constitution, only the president could instruct Yancey on his diplomatic duties. 67
Although they could not present it themselves, the Committee on Foreign Relations
composed a foreign policy directive containing instructions that they hoped Davis would
explain to Yancey. Unfortunately, Davis never got around to it, leaving Yancey entirely
without direction. 68
Prior to Yancey's departure, one of his colleagues asked him how he how to
planned on negotiating with the British. His reply was fluff, only generalizations about
the importance of cotton. "Sir," his colleague exclaimed after hearing his response, "you
have no business in Europe. You carry no argument which Europe cares to hear ... My
counsel to you as a friend is, if you value your reputation, to stay at home. " 69
But by this counsel Yancey would not abide. Uninstructed, he sailed for Europe.
Once he arrived, since he had no formal authorization for what he could lay out in
negotiations, he soon became restless and discontent, feeling like less a diplomat and
more like a blockade statistics billboard. Worst of all, because the communications he
received from home base were erratic, infrequent, and insufficient, even the statistics he
touted were inadequate. "Not a day passes that fails to bring demands upon us ... [for]
information concerning the inefficiency of the blockade," he wrote home irritably.
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"Unfortunately we have been compelled to meet all such inquiries with the reply that 'we
hope to be able to answer them by the next advices. "' 70
Yancey's floppy blockade diplomacy made little impact overseas. Although he
achieved British recognition of Southern belligerency, his accomplishments ended there.
The limited scope of his negotiations led England to declare that she "could not
acknowledge the Confederate States until the war or further negotiations more clearly
determined their position. The British were so entirely unimpressed by what Yancey
had to offer that Charles Francis Adams, the Union minister to Britain, was able to
convince the British authorities to no longer receive the Southern "pseudocommissioners" at all. 72 Yancey heard of that declaration through a painful route, reading
of his diplomatic fate in public documents. He was outraged, determined to file a
complaint because the British has declared that they had "no intention of seeing [the
Confederate commissioners] again," but his colleagues held him back, convinced that it
would exacerbate rather than remedy the situation. 73
Verbally estranged from the officials whom he had crossed the Atlantic to
encounter, Yancey and his fellow commissioners were forced to compose a letter to the
British outlining what the South had to offer. Unfortunately, the only thing the letter
could serve up was the usual: a steamy invitation for the British to break the blockade
sauteed in barbed rhetoric about broken Declaration of Paris vows. After all, the
Confederates pointed out (as usual), it was the responsibility of "the neutrals, whose
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commerce is seriously damaged, to determine for how long a blockade, of such a
character, [should] be respected." 74
Predictably, the letter confined the Confederacy's role to playing the damsel in
distress until she received recognition. She claimed no responsibility for breaking the
blockade; her sole duty would be resuming a lucrative cotton trade once the war was
concluded. The English needed her, she insisted, and if they wished to survive, they
would "consider the necessities of commercial relations with [the South and their
importance] to the preservation of certain great interests in England." 75
After elegantly inking their allurements, the diplomats tagged onto their
document's end an afterthought that if the British were not entirely persuaded to come to
the Confederate Union's aid after reading this letter, "such an announcement [would] be
received with surprise." 76 But when the letter was ignored, Yancey was not astonished.
Although his rhetoric in the letter had remained lofty, by late 1861 his hopes were not.
Shortly after sending the diplomatic letter, he sent off yet another-his resignation. 77
The dead-end nature of Southern blockade diplomacy had morphed the diplomat's
shining ideals into a tarnished admission of disillusionment. "Had I known the trouble
and delay involved in this mission," he wrote home, "I should never have accepted [the
position]."78 Although nearly all of Yancey's diplomatic efforts had aimed to sour the
British opinion of the Northern blockade, Great Britain had her sights set on securing a
new naval precedent, and as a result she was unmoved by Yancey's empty bids for her
favor. Yancey had unearthed Britain's attitude the hard way and was sorely disappointed;
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it was with great difficulty that he was persuaded to stay put until his successors'
arrival. 79
Captive Controversy

Although many Southerners were temporarily discouraged by the failure of
Yancey's mission, their hopes were soon revived by a confidence in their new foreign
commissioner to England, James Mason. Prior missions had been premature, Southerners
reasoned-now the time was truly ripe. 80 After all, by late 1861, they believed that, not
only were a stream of military victories speaking eloquently in their favor, but the
economic impact of the embargo must be testifying on their behalf as well. Papers like
the Morning Post were so optimistic that they proclaimed that Mason and his companion,
John Slidell, the Confederate commissioner to France, had "achieved [Southern]
independence" by simply setting sail. In reality, however, the two diplomats would
probably not have achieved much more than Yancey had the Trent affair had not been
brought to fruition by the permeability ofthe Union blockade. 81
Although Mason and Slidell had made careful preparations for running the
blockade, the one thing they did not do carefully was keep a secret. In fact, the specifics
of their departure had been so trumpeted that the Union was able to increase the number
of warships guarding the Charleston harbor from one to five before the Confederates'
blockade runner departed. 82 But in spite of the beef-up barrier, Mason's crew slipped
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effortlessly through and began their journey towards Nassau, where they planned to
board the British steamer that would carry them across the Atlantic.
If the Northern blockade had been unbreakable and had intercepted Mason's
Britain-bound crew, England would have been annoyed, but the affair would probably
have blown over. The blockade's permeability and the circumstances that this weakness
bred, however, ensured that there would be no simple solutions. After running the
blockade, Mason and his crew arrived in Nassau and eventually boarded the British mail
steamer, the Trent. Soon afterwards they were intercepted by Captain John Wilkes, an
overzealous naval officer without government authorization who was determined to
terminate Mason's "diabolical scheme" and to avenge the blockade, which had been
humiliated by the ease with which it had been run. 83
Although Wilkes was trying to aid the Union cause, his actions gave the
Confederacy their best chances of success yet. There were many routes of justifying what
Wilkes had done by international law, but there was no way of justifying away the British
wrath that he had incurred. 84 Jefferson Davis captured the essence of British outrage
when he exclaimed:
These gentlemen were as much under the jurisdiction of the British
Government upon that ship and beneath that flag as if they had been on its
soil, and a claim on the part of the United States to seize them in the
streets of London would have been as well founded as that to apprehend
them where they were taken. 85
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Slidell, Mason's companion, had also realized the magnitude of the opportunity being
thrust into their laps. In fact, he was so eager to be seized and to have the British
emotionally drawn into the war on the Southern side that when the British captain of the

Trent refused to reveal to Wilkes whether or not Mason's party was onboard, Slidell
stepped forward and voluntarily made known his presence. 86
Because the Northerners were so busy rejoicing, it took them a while to process
the diplomatic implications of Wilkes's rash actions. For the North, Wilkes's news was a
life-preserver in a sea of military setbacks. Better yet, it piggybacked another piece of
fantastic news that had arrived only three days before the announcement that the North
had finally captured their first Southern cotton port. William Seward, the Union Secretary
of War, had long hoped for this development, which he was sure "would materially
change the views of the European powers." 87 For good-news starved Northerners, the
two tidbits combined to spawn a "storm of exultation." 88
As a result, Wilkes received a promotion, the "emphatic approval of the [naval]
department," congressional congratulations "for his brave, adroit and patriotic conduct in
arresting and detaining the Mssrs. Mason and Slidell," and the common man's adulation
to boot. 89 The New York Times hailed him as the "hero of the hour," Harper's Weekly
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rhapsodized about his ''triumph[s]" and "glories," and Northern opinion ran hot in his
favor, positive that his actions were justifiable by internationallaw. 90
"We will wrap the world in flames!" exclaimed William Seward, the Northern
Secretary of War, in answer to an inquiry about how the Union would respond to a
British declaration of war over the Trent affair. ''No power so remote that she will not
feel the fire of our battle and be burned by our conflagration.'m But despite the sweeping
implications of Seward's words, one guest at the party cautioned the correspondent for
the London Times not to take Seward's emotions at face value. "That's all bugaboo talk,"
the guest confided. "When Seward talks that way, he means to break down. He is most
dangerous and obstinate when he pretends to agree with you." 92
The guest was on target. Seward was posturing for good reason. After all, as the
Confederate Secretary of War phrased it, "the press rules America ... no one can face it
and live. ,,93 Seward did not at first understand the importance of presenting a
disapproving Northern reaction to Wilkes's actions, what he did understand was that he
could not swim against the rip tide of public opinion without being washed out to sea. As
a result, for a time the Union government obliged the American people their desire by
refusing to hand over the captive diplomats. This situation, like so many others, had been
spawned by the incompetence of the Northern blockade. And so the North reacted and
then sat tight, testing the waters for a British reaction. Very soon a definitive response
arrived.

Southern Diplomacy, Take Two
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It took the beating of war drums to convince Union celebrations to subside. And

this time the threat did not come form the South; it came from Canada, the route through
which the British were planning to invade. The British did not share Northern
appreciation for Wilkes's swashbuckling, seeing it not as an act of heroism but instead as
"a wanton act of aggression."94 "The occurrence cannot but have a baleful effect on our
future relations with this government," wrote home Foreign Minister Richard Lyons.
After all, the American people were "pleased at having ... insulted the British flag."
Even if Wilkes's action could be justified by international law, Lyons was determined
that such impertinence should not be permitted to prevail. Then ''they would be
confirmed in their idea that England will bear anything from them. " 95
The eruption of such a conflict instigated by the Northern blockade was precisely
what the Confederacy had been hoping for, and she took this opportunity to revamp her
foreign diplomatic policy accordingly. In the past, she had discovered that arriving
promptly for vigilant negotiations had not gotten her very far; after all, Yancey had sped
to Britain, arriving only 17 days after Fort Sumter had been fired upon, and his haste had
accomplished little. Now, courtesy of the leaky Union blockade, Mason could experiment
WI'th
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a new strategy: arriYLQg
While the British were wading through the conflict, Robert Bunch, the

Confederate console in Charleston, Virginia, kept a steady stream of statistics disproving
the blockade's adequacy flowing across the sea. "The blockade is the laughing stock of
the Southern merchant marine," he wrote. "There is in reality no blockade at all of this
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coast . . . Vessels of various sizes enter and sail almost at pleasure. " 97 Bunch hoped that
in the heat of the Trent controversy the frustrated British would fmally be more receptive
to such information.
For a while, the strategy seemed to be working. The New York Times
correspondent in London sensed a drastic change in mood. "A Northern man in London
is subject to many humiliations. Public opinion is against him," he lamented. "If there has
been a disposition [in England] to overlook small matters connected with the blockade
and neutral rights, it exists no longer."98
But although the common Englishman might have been war-dancing in the street,
the British leaders were more reticent. They understood, as they had from the start, that
entering a foreign war was a major commitment, and as a result felt "distress[ed] and
alarm[ed]" by the progression of events. 99 If they had to, they were more than willing to
"inflict a severe blow upon, and ... read a lesson to the United States which [would] not
soon be forgotten."

100

But it was not their first choice, and they would gladly exchange

the prospect of a bloody brawl for the Southern diplomats' "immediate delivery" and a
Northern "apology for the aggression that had been committed."
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In an effort to extort such results, the British launched a hardcore program of
military fortification in Canada, realizing that the more intimidating the preparations for
war in Canada were, ''the more likelihood [there was] that peace [could] yet be
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preserved." 102 As a result, "both the Imperial authorities [of Canada] and the people
[began] preparing for the worst." 103 The Confederate leaders licked their lips. Finally, it
appeared that rickety blockade itself had forced the British into a situation where they
could no longer quietly stand by.
Seward Saves the Day

At first it appeared that the Trent affair, which had been spawned by the leaky
blockade's weaknesses, would be the North's destruction. In the end, however, the affair
fostered more communication between the Union and Great Britain than it did dissent,
increasing the foreign powers' trust in one another and lubricating the process of
negotiations with goodwill. Because of the relationships that it built, the process required
to dissipate the uproar over the Trent both righted the situation and-ironically-ensured
the blockade's survival.
Traditionally, British trust in the Northern Cabinet had been less than solid,
especially in William Seward, the Northern Secretary of War. Early in 1861, the British
minister to the Union had written home that he "[did] not implicitly rely on all Mr.
Seward's assurances." 104 Such a belief was not confined to his mind alone; the rest of the
British Cabinet also regarded Seward with fear mainly because he came off as volatile,
unpredictable, and war-mongering, the Kim 11 Jong ofthe nineteenth century. 105
Outward appearances indicated that the British fears were well-founded. Seward
frequently derided Britain, whom he saw as the "the greatest, the most grasping, and the
most rapacious power in the world." He longed to kidnap her colonies and was very
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outspoken in his belief that her removal was essential if the United States were to become
a truly dominant power. 106 When the Civil War had first begun, Seward longed to reunite
the North and the South in a common cause: a war against Europe. 107 Shortly into the
Civil War, he surrendered that hope, but he never seemed to drop his fascination with an
impending conflict with Europe over the most minute details.
On innumerable occasions, Lincoln had had to tone down Seward's ultimatums to
the British by editing his letters to foreign diplomats. 108 Even after Lincoln's tweaking,
however, many of Seward's statements remained blatantly offensive. Seward's posturing
attitude was one of the primary reasons that the British minister to the Union was
frustrated with what he perceived as an overall Northern belief that she could "conquer
the South with one hand and chastise Europe with the other." 109 Worst of all, Seward was
explosively impulsive and would sometimes fire off flammable rhetoric that he insisted
be carbon-copied to the British leaders at the very moment it was mailed to the American
ambassador. This made the American ambassador's job of softening Seward's message
considerably more difficult and decreased the likelihood that the Union would long
.

.

remam m a one-enemy war.
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Lucky for the Union, the delays inherent in overseas communication caused the

Trent affair to take three months to be resolved, a long enough period of time for tempers
to cool and judgment to become unclouded. 111 At first Seward had been one of Wilkes's
most solid supporters, but the long lapse in cordial communications, which had been

106

Ibid, 30-31.
Graebner, 53.
108
Jenkins, 104.
109
"Lyons to Russell, Dispatch 263," June 8, 1861, British Eyes, I: Ill.
110
Jenkins, 42-43.
111
Adams, 1:230.
107

Ford 31
filled with ostentatious Canadian war preparations, gave Seward a chance to come to his
senses and be persuaded that the Union had "no time to be diverted .. . into controversies
with other powers, even if just causes for them could be found." 112 The fact that Seward
had come around gave the British a rare opportunity to see in him the rational leader they
so wanted to do business with. 113
What encouraged the British was the quality of communication between Seward
and Richard Lyons, the British minister to the Union. Although Seward refused to
completely reveal his hand, the increase in amicable communication was remarkable.
Lyons was satisfied by Seward's attitude of listening to British demands "seriously and
with dignity," "without any manifestations of dissatisfaction." In an especially
uncharacteristic moment, Seward "begged [Lyons] to be assured that [Seward] was very
sensible of the friendly and conciliatory manner of British demands."

114

Seward was not a man to beg, and his change in attitude was so groundbreaking
that Lyons had no qualms about lending Seward an unofficial copy of the list of British
demands so that Seward could work to soften the American response to the letter's
official announcement. Lyons felt so comfortable with Seward's behavior that, rather
than demanding an answer immediately, he gave Seward "until tomorrow" to think the
communications over. 115 In the end, Lyons' indulgences paid off, yielding both the
surrender of the prisoners and an "[admission] that Reparation is due to Great Britain." 116
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After the Trent affair was resolved, British public opinion was as strongly behind
the Union as it had once been opposed to it. The news of the conflict's resolution,
announced between acts at the local British theaters, brought standing ovations. 117 But
beyond winning the goodwill of the common man, the Trent affair had won British
approval for the Northern Secretary of War as well, laying a foundation of trust for future
negotiations.118 "I do not believe that Seward has any animosity to this country," wrote
one prominent diplomat confidently. "It is all buncom" (sic). "At all events I am heart
and soul a neutral ... What a fuss we have had about these two men." 119 And just like
that, the blockade-created disaster was averted, contrary to all expectations. Not only did
the Union and Great Britain not go to war over the issue, but their relationship was
enhanced by it instead.
Foiled Again
After Seward's (temporary) diplomatic makeover, the tides of British favor turned

°

noticeably Northem. 12 Charles Francis Adams, the Union minister to London, who could
feel the wintry British opinion melting to spring, cheerfully branded the affair's outcome
"rather opportune than otherwise." 121 "Our victory is won on this side of the water," he
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declared. "The prospect of [British] interference with us is growing more and more
remote." 122
Southerners also observed the change and were consumed by a "deep and burning
.. . rage" mixed with hapless despair. 123 "The Trent affair has done us incalculable
injury," one Confederate wrote home from London. Jefferson Davis was equally
infuriated, exasperated because he correctly observed that the "neutral rights [granted by
Britain] were alternately asserted and waived in such manner as to bear with great
severity on [the South], while conferring signal advantages on [the North]." 124
In this midst of this storm of emotions, Mason finally arrived in England in late
January on the very vessel he had been expected to cruise up in months before. But in
spite of the fact that the British had butted heads with the Union to ensure Mason's safe
arrival, Mason observed with alarm that once he set foot on shore the British leaders
treated him with a "studied discourtesy."
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He felt keenly what he did not yet know, that

the British had decided he should "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise
than as a distinguished gentlemen." 126 John Russell, the British foreign secretary, met
with him but refused to view his credentials, deeming the gesture "unnecessary [since
their] relations were unofficial." 127 Beyond that, Russell's attitude towards Mason was
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cold, transparently unsympathetic, and very aloof. "His personal sympathies were not
with us," Mason lamented, "his policy inaction." 128
Unfortunately for Mason, not only did he have to cope with the Trent affair's
resulting Northern goodwill, but he also had little with which he could entice the British
to change their attitude. Although his instructions from home were more sufficient than
Yancey's had been, both his tactics for inciting British intervention and the success that
they engendered bore a striking resemblance to his predecessor's policies. 129 Mason had
tried to set his strategy apart by carrying across the seas recent and thorough statistics that
"would prove completely the utter inefficacy of the blockade;" unfortunately, by the time
he actually arrived, the statistics were hopelessly dated. 130
Although Colonel Bunch did keep a steady trickle of blockade-busting
information coming from his Charleston post, British opinion was by this time too strong
in Northern favor for Bunch's statistics to make much of an impact. Although Lord
Russell, the British foreign secretary, claimed that Bunch's letters would "induce [them]
to consider the whole view of this question with a view to deciding what the course of the
government should be," the British were inclined towards indifference. Instead of zeroing
in on the blockade's flagrant violations, Russell focused on the "great exaggeration[s]"
128
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that the Southerners had used and accused them of cooking the books just as Britain's
enemies done in previous wars. 131
Rather than focusing on Bunch's statistics, Russell urged Parliament to consider
the big picture when pondering a change of stance on the blockade:
Has the Southern coast had a free and uninterrupted communication with
Europe? Have your lordships heard that cotton has arrived in its usual
quantities here, and that the manufacturers of Great Britain and France
have arrived freely at the ports of the States which are now in a state of
civil war? On the contrary, the intelligence we received shows that there
has been no uninterrupted intercourse, but that great inconvenience has
been suffered by the inhabitants of these Southern states, owing to the
existence of that blockade, which is said to be defective. 132
He reminded them that they had "entered into no engagement with that [Confederate]
Government" thus far, and it would probably be best if matters stayed that way. 133 After
all, he explained what the Trent affair had made increasingly obvious: that for Britain to
take sides in the Civil War would have "been a misfortune and calamity for the world,
and for the people of America especially." 134
As a result, Parliament decided to leave England's official stance on the blockade
unaltered; after all, the blockade was by "now universally acknowledged as
unobjectionable." 135 Plus, they claimed, echoing the long-term North attitude, the issues
of the Southern recognition and the Northern blockade were so tightly intertwined that
131
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one could not be approached without affecting the other. 136 After all, the North had as of
late been overwhelmingly cooperative; to reward its good behavior with a sudden
retraction of approval for its blockade would be the same as starting an "unproclaimed
war."

137

And the last thing the British wanted was war.

Conclusion
Although the British would continue to consider intervention as the war
continued, after the years of 1861 to 1862 a beefed-up blockade would ensure that the
British did not use the North's inadequate blockade to justify British intervention. 138
Although the Northern blockade would never measure up to the requirements laid down
in the Declaration of Paris (and what fantastical blockade ever could?), it would become
sufficiently sturdy to please two of the three parties involved.
Although the ramshackle Northern blockade could have become a Southern ticket
to success, the delays of 1861 to 1862 caused a vital opportunity to be missed. 139
Southern miscalculations were largely responsible for this enormous uh-oh. The
Confederates were correct in believing that the British were driven by self-interest, but
because they underestimated British foresight, the Confederates misdiagnosed the route
that this interest would necessitate. The South was sure that the top British priority would
be cotton; they had no idea that concerns about blockade precedents were even on the
British radar.
Although the North never wanted to have an ineffective blockade, the blockade's
inadequacy accomplished more for the North than ten Declaration-of-Paris worthy
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blockades could have done because the situation decreased British interest in
intervention. This instance provides a valuable lesson for historians. Nations at war are
not perfect and cannot always tell what will be in their best interest in the long run,
whether they will ride their weaknesses to victory or be thwarted by their strengths.
A study of the development of precedents in this situation is also worthy of our
consideration. As our world becomes increasingly global, the foreign relational tact
exhibited by the British in the Civil War becomes an increasingly relevant model for all
nations. Because Britain thoughtfully navigated (or rather, refused to navigate) dangerous
diplomatic waters, they transformed what could have been a quagmire into an
opportunity. Swift British thinking made it so that two nations could emerge victorious
from the conflict: the North, who fought long and hard, and the British, who never fought
at all. Today's diplomatically-savvy nations will do the same.
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